The Impact of Emerging Asia on Commodity Prices by Calista Cheung & Sylvie Morin
Working Paper/Document de travail
2007-55
The Impact of Emerging Asia
on Commodity Prices
by Calista Cheung and Sylvie Morin
www.bank-banque-canada.caBank of Canada Working Paper 2007-55
December 2007
The Impact of Emerging Asia
on Commodity Prices
by
Calista Cheung and Sylvie Morin
International Department
Bank of Canada
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1A 0G9
ccheung@bankofcanada.ca
smorin@bankofcanada.ca
Bank of Canada working papers are theoretical or empirical works-in-progress on subjects in
economics and ﬁnance. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors.
No responsibility for them should be attributed to the Bank of Canada.
ISSN 1701-9397 © 2007 Bank of Canadaii
Acknowledgements
The authors thank René Lalonde for his extremely helpful guidance and support. The authors also
thank Robert Lafrance, Don Coletti, Michael Francis, Eric Santor, Frédérick Demers, Jocelyn Jacob,
Larry Schembri, Dirk Muir, Nicolas Parent, Denise Côté, and seminar participants at the Bank of
Canada, 41st Meeting of the Canadian Economics Association (Halifax, June 2007), and Asia-
Paciﬁc Economic Association Conference (Hong Kong, July 2007) for their helpful comments,
and Sylvie Malette for her help with data collection. The views expressed herein and any
remaining errors are those of the authors.iii
Abstract
Over the past 5 years, real energy and non-energy commodity prices have trended sharply higher.
These relative price movements have had important implications for inﬂation and economic
activity in both Canada and the rest of the world. China has accounted for the bulk of incremental
demand for oil and many base metals over this period. As rapid economic growth in China has
raised the level of world demand, this has put upward pressure on commodity prices. The effect
has been ampliﬁed by rising resource intensities in China’s production in recent years. This paper
discusses the factors driving emerging Asia’s demand for commodities and assesses the impact of
emerging Asia on the real prices of oil and base metals in the Bank of Canada Commodity Price
Index (BCPI). Two separate single-equation models are estimated for oil and the base metals price
index. We employ a structural break approach for oil prices, while metals prices are modelled
with an error correction model (ECM). In both cases, we ﬁnd strong evidence that oil and metals
prices have historically moved with the business cycle in the developed world, but that this
relationship has broken down since mid-1997. Thereafter, industrial activity in emerging Asia
appears to have become a more dominant driver of oil price movements. While metal price
ﬂuctuations have also become increasingly aligned with levels of industrial activity in emerging
Asia, rising intensities of metal production may have been a more important factor behind the
acceleration in prices in recent years.
JEL classiﬁcation: E3, F4, O19, Q11
Bank classiﬁcation: Business ﬂuctuations and cycles; International topics
Résumé
Ces cinq dernières années, les cours réels des produits de base énergétiques et non énergétiques se
sont orientés nettement à la hausse. Ces mouvements des prix relatifs ont eu une incidence
importante sur l’inﬂation et l’activité économique au Canada comme dans le reste du monde. La
Chine a été la principale responsable de l’augmentation de la demande enregistrée pour le pétrole
et pour de nombreux métaux communs pendant cette période. La croissance rapide de l’économie
chinoise a fait grimper le niveau de la demande mondiale et a exercé, par ricochet, une pression
haussière sur les prix des produits de base. Depuis quelques années, cet effet se trouve davantage
accentué par l’intensiﬁcation de l’emploi des ressources naturelles dans les productions chinoises.
Les auteures examinent les facteurs déterminants de la demande de matières premières dans les
pays émergents d’Asie et évaluent l’impact de la montée en puissance de ces pays sur les cours
réels du pétrole et des métaux communs mesurés par l’indice des prix des produits de base de laiv
Banque du Canada. Elles estiment deux modèles à équation unique, l’un pour l’indice des prix du
pétrole et l’autre pour l’indice des prix des métaux communs. Elles appliquent aux cours du
pétrole une approche fondée sur la détermination de ruptures structurelles, mais formalisent les
prix des métaux à l’aide d’un modèle à correction d’erreurs. Dans les deux cas, des éléments
probants indiquent que si les prix du pétrole et des métaux ont évolué historiquement en fonction
du cycle économique des pays développés, ce lien s’est rompu au milieu de l’année 1997. Depuis
lors, l’activité industrielle des économies émergentes d’Asie paraît jouer un rôle plus central dans
les variations des cours pétroliers. Bien que les ﬂuctuations des prix des métaux s’arriment elles
aussi de plus en plus à l’activité industrielle des pays émergents d’Asie, il se peut que
l’intensiﬁcation de l’utilisation des métaux dans la production ait eu, en comparaison, une plus
grande inﬂuence sur la hausse des prix de ces dernières années.
Classiﬁcation JEL : E3, F4, O19, Q11
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Cycles et ﬂuctuations économiques; Questions internationales 1 
1. Introduction 
Over the past 5 years, real energy and non-energy commodity prices have trended sharply 
higher. These relative price movements have had important implications for both 
inflation and economic activity in Canada and the rest of the world.
1 Dramatic increases 
have been observed primarily in oil and base metals prices, and can be justified in part by 
strengthening demand conditions in the industrialized world, the depreciation of the U.S. 
dollar, and slow supply responses. However, China has accounted for the bulk of 
incremental demand for oil and many base metals during this period. As rapid economic 
growth in China has raised the level of world demand, this has placed upward pressure on 
commodity prices. This effect has been further amplified  by increasing resource 
intensities of China’s production in recent years.  
This paper discusses the factors driving emerging Asia’s demand for commodities 
and  uses an empirical approach to assess the impact of emerging Asia on the real prices 
of oil and base metals in the Bank of Canada Commodity Price Index (BCPI).
2 Given 
emerging Asia’s growing prominence in the world economy, it is important to understand 
its impact on commodities markets and its role behind  recent price movements. An 
enhanced understanding of these aspects would allow us to better assess the implications 
for commodity prices going forward, and improve the accuracy of Bank of Canada 
projection models for policy analysis. Study of emerging Asia’s impact on commodity 
prices has been limited to date, given that its upsurge in demand has been relatively 
recent. While Lalonde and Muir (2006) are able to simulate the recent rise in commodity 
prices within a DSGE framework through combining a permanent productivity increase 
in emerging Asia with a shock to energy intensity, the literature to date has provided little 
empirical support for this outcome. 
                                                  
1 Since Canada is a net exporter for most commodities, a sustained increase in commodity prices would generate an 
appreciation in the exchange rate  and  a shift in productive resources towards commodity-producing sectors. The 
improved terms of trade would create wealth effects and raise consumption. 
2 Examination of agricultural and forestry product prices is left for future research, as increases observed thus far have 
been small in real terms and are likely too recent to be captured in estimations. For North American forestry markets, 
supplies have been heavily influenced by changes in softwood lumber agreements as well as industry restructuring and 
capacity closures over recent years. In food markets, crop supplies have been highly dependent on weather conditions. 
More recently, food prices have surged, reflecting pressures from strong demand for bio-fuel, increased demand from 
emerging markets, and adverse supply shocks.  
 
  2 
Given the heterogeneity across different commodity markets, two separate single-
equation models are estimated for oil and base metals prices. We employ a structural 
break approach for oil prices, based on previous findings of structural shifts by Lalonde, 
Zhu, and Demers (2003). For the base metals price index, an error correction model 
(ECM) is estimated. We find strong evidence that while oil and metals prices have 
historically moved with the business cycle in developed economies, this relationship 
broke down around mid-1997.  Thereafter, industrial activity in emerging Asia appears to 
have become a more dominant determinant of oil price movements. While metals price 
fluctuations have also become increasingly aligned with  levels of industrial activity in 
emerging Asia, rising metals intensities of production may have been a more important 
factor behind the recent acceleration in prices. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes recent developments in 
commodity price behaviour and Section 3 discusses the sources of emerging Asia’s 
demand for commodities. A brief literature review is provided in Section 4, followed by a 
description of the theoretical framework and data in Section 5. The model specifications 
and results are discussed in Section 6, with concluding remarks in Section 7. 
 
2.  Recent Behaviour in Real Commodity Prices  
While real commodity prices had been on a downward trend for much of the past 25 
years, they have moved persistently higher since the end of 2001.3 This is illustrated in 
Figure 1, which plots the Bank of Canada Non-Energy Commodity Price Index in real 
terms and the real West Texas Intermediate (WTI) benchmark crude oil price. Figure 2 
illustrates the evolution of prices of the major non-energy commodity groups from 1980 
to the end of 2006.
4 The BCPI is constructed from the U.S. dollar spot or transaction 
prices of 23 key Canadian commodities produced in Canada and sold in world markets. A 
list of the commodities and their weights is provided in Table 1 in the Appendix.  
The real price increases since the end of 2001 have been concentrated primarily in 
crude oil and base metals, which are now above or close to historical peaks of the last 25 
                                                  
3 The downward trend in real metals prices over history may be largely attributed to productivity gains in 
this sector and declining metals intensities in major industrialized countries. Meanwhile, advances in 
technology and agro-science, appear to have played a key role in driving down real agricultural prices. 
4 In Figures 1 and 2, all non-energy commodity price indexes are deflated using the U.S. producer price 
index for finished goods. The crude oil price is deflated by the U.S. GDP deflator.  3 
years. The upward trend has been broadly based across different metals, suggesting that 
common factors have been responsible. As macroeconomic demand conditions in 
industrialized countries have traditionally been main determinants of commodity prices, 
some of the recent price surges can be explained by robust global economic growth, as 
illustrated by recent increases in  year-over-year growth in OECD industrial production 
shown in Figure 3 . A significant depreciation of the US dollar in recent years, shown in 
Fig.  4, may have also played a role. However, the expanding share of commodities 
consumption attributable to emerging Asia suggests that the region has contributed 
importantly to demand pressures in recent years. Due to declining investment in energy 
and metals extraction and refining industries since the late 1990s (see Fig. 5), production 
capacity has been slow to respond. As a result, spare oil production capacity has fallen to 
historic lows (see Fig. 6), along with many base metals inventories.  
 
3.  A Decomposition of Asia’s Demand for Commodities 
Over the past 5 years, China has accounted for the majority of incremental demand for 
copper, nickel, and zinc, as well as a substantial portion of oil demand growth.  The first 
two columns of Table 2 depict China’s expanding share of world demand growth for oil 
and the four base metals contained in the BCPI. Because China has a low domestic 
endowment of natural resources relative to its needs, it has become a net importer of most 
commodities, as shown in Figure 7.5  
China's expanding appetite for industrial materials can be decomposed into two 
sources: i) its rapid industrialization and infrastructure investment to meet the needs of an 
expanding urban population, and ii) its growing industrial integration with other East 
Asian countries to become a major world exporter of manufactured goods. Of course, 
these two factors are highly interrelated, since China’s thriving export industry has been a 
major catalyst for rising domestic investment and urban migration in recent years. 
Nevertheless, it is worth distinguishing between these two sources of demand for 
commodities. This is because the first channel is driven by final domestic demand in 
                                                  
5 While China is the sixth largest crude oil producer in the world, it has been a net importer of oil since 
1993. China has also recently emerged as a top producer and net exporter of aluminum. However, China’s 
net imports of alumina (the main input for aluminum production) have surged since 2001, accompanied by 
steep increases in alumina prices. This suggests that China has likely impacted aluminum prices indirectly 
through driving up the input costs of production. 
  4 
China and is expected to be a persistent source of commodities demand going forward, 
whereas the second is more dependent on external demand conditions, and is expected to 
eventually diminish in importance as growth rotates towards domestic demand. 
Henceforth, we refer to the first source as the domestic demand channel, and the second 
as the export channel.  
 
3.1. Domestic Demand Channel 
Although China has continuously developed its urban infrastructure and domestic 
industry for quite some time, its energy and metals intensities have only advanced 
noticeably in recent years. As Figures 9 to  13 show, China’s per GDP consumption has 
accelerated since 2003 for energy and zinc, and since the late 1990s for aluminum, 
copper and nickel.  As discussed in Rosen and Houser (2007), much of this is attributable 
to the substantive growth in energy-intensive and capital-intensive industries - such as 
steel, aluminum, cement, and glass – used for road and building construction.6 
Studies show that resource demands in developing countries typically begin to 
climb during the early phase of industrialization, and eventually stabilize and then decline 
as income levels advance, creating an inverted U-curve.
7 For example, Figure 14 plots the 
per capita consumption of zinc against real GDP per capita (2000 U.S. dollar terms) for 
China, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. Similar graphs for energy and other 
base metals show comparable patterns, and are thus not shown. Based on the experiences 
of Japan in the 1960s and Korea in the 1980s, emerging Asia’s energy and metals 
intensities could be expected to gain momentum at income levels between $5000-$10,000 
per capita, and continue to grow rapidly before slowing at income levels of about 
$15,000-$20,000 per capita.
8 Indeed, for countries whose per capita income levels range 
between $5000-$10,000 (China, Thailand, and Malaysia), resource intensities have 
                                                  
6 China’s energy elasticity of GDP growth averaged a modest 0.6 over the 1980s-1990s, leading to a substantial 
reduction in the amount of energy required to produce each unit of GDP. This may have been related to gains in energy 
efficiencies and market reforms that encouraged structural shifts away from heavy industry (e.g. steel and cement) 
towards labour-intensive light manufacturing (e.g. textiles). This trend has reversed in recent years, as economic 
incentives have favoured energy -intensive industries.  Since 2001, it is estimated that this energy elasticity has almost 
doubled. For more details, see Lardy (2006). 
7 For example, see Cleveland and Ruth (1999), Park and Zhai (2006), and Garnaut and Song (2006). 
8 A slowing in China’s resource intensities would be dependent on its industry moving away from manufacturing 
towards a service sector orientation.  5 
accelerated in recent years. In contrast, little change has been observed thus far in India, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines, where per capita income levels remain below $5000. 
Garnaut and  Song (2006) propose three key variables that drive a country’s 
energy and metals use: investment share of output, export share of production, and rate of 
urbanization (defined as the fraction of population that is urban). So far, China’s resource 
intensities have been bolstered primarily by advancing investment and export shares of 
output in recent years, displayed in Figure 15.
9 Looking ahead, consumption is expected 
to become the leading driver of energy and metals demand, as rising incomes of urban 
workers generates growing automobile ownership and consumption of household 
durables. The proportion of China’s population living in cities  - currently at 40%, 
compared with Japan at 66% and Korea at 81% (see Fig. 16) - should also continue to 
progress for some time. Together, these factors suggest that the domestic demand channel 
should be a persistent source of demand for commodities going forward. 
 
3.2. Export Channel 
China’s expanding international trade, following its accession to the WTO in 
2001, has been an important factor behind its escalating demand for industrial materials. 
Much of this trade growth has been associated with China’s integration into the cross-
border processing chain as a low-cost final assembler of manufactured goods. Adopting 
this role has generated a surge in China’s exports of manufactured goods and increased 
raw material needs. Li and Song (2006) suggest that increasing bilateral trade and similar 
export structures between China and ASEAN countries reflect regional fragmentation of 
production by  multinational corporations seeking economies of scale. It is estimated that 
a large portion of China’s exports originate from Japanese and other Asian countries, for 
final destination in U.S. and European markets. Consequently, while China has fostered a 
swelling trade surplus with the West, it has also built trade deficits with Japan, Korea, 
and the ASEAN-4 countries, as shown in Figure 8. Furthermore, Li and Song (2006) find 
that the composition of Asian exports has shifted from  goods that are  agricultural-
intensive and labour-intensive towards goods that are more capital-intensive over the last 
                                                  
9 The transportation sector has also become increasingly important. The number of motor vehicles on the road has 
doubled in the last 5 years, and transportation has accounted for 42% of China’s growth in oil consumption since 1995.  6 
decade. This change has likely boosted the metals and energy content of the region’s 
manufacturing activity. 
Because China is only one part of the manufacturing process for Asia’s exported 
goods, it is important to also examine the role of other Asian  economies in boosting 
commodities demand.  Figure 17 illustrates that  since 2000,  larger shares of world 
manufacturing activity  have been accumulated by China, the NIEs, and ASEAN-4.
10  
Table 2 compares the shares of commodities demand growth of China with those of other 
Asian countries. These statistics indicate that the contributions of ASEAN-4 to demand 
growth in oil and base metals have increased significantly in recent years, but remain 
modest compared to China. India and Japan have seen little increase in their shares of 
world demand growth for these commodities, while the portion attributable to Asian NIE 
countries has diminished for all commodities examined.
11  
To the extent that emerging Asia is boosting the global supply of manufactured 
goods, higher production levels would generate a higher level of world demand for raw 
materials. It is worth emphasizing that it is the incremental world demand attributable to 
emerging Asia that moves commodity prices. This amount is generally difficult to isolate, 
as part of the observed increase in Asia’s production levels could reflect manufacturing 
activity that has simply been outsourced from higher-cost countries, for re-export to those 
countries.
12 The declines observed in Japanese and U.S. shares of world manufacturing 
activity since 2000 (shown in Fig. 17) suggest that mounting exports from emerging Asia 
may be displacing production in the rest of the world.
13 Therefore, the increase in  world 
demand for commodities is likely to be smaller than the incremental demand suggested 
                                                  
10 In particular, China’s shares of global production have more than doubled since 2000 to 28% for 
aluminum, 35% for steel, and 48% for cement.  
11 Although this suggests little role for the NIEs in driving recent commodity price increases, South Korea’s 
contribution to world nickel demand growth over 2001-2005 more than doubled to 33%, from 15% in the 
previous 5 years. This increase has been more than offset by a significant decline in Taiwan’s share. 
12 Another reason emerging Asia’s influence on commodity prices may be difficult to identify is that a 
significant portion of the region’s manufactured goods are exported to the Americas and Europe. 
Consequently, one could arguably attribute the related raw materials usage to external demand. As 
concluded in a study by the Asian Development Bank (2007) on Asian intra-industry trade, growth in 
manufactures exports from emerging Asia remains heavily reliant on final demand from  outside the region. 
Accordingly, the region’s demand for commodities for its production of manufactures exports is arguably 
more driven by the business cycle in the industrialized world than in emerging Asia itself. 
13 The observed declines in net exports to the U.S. from Japan, Singapore, and Hong Kong since 2000 
(shown in Fig. 18) may also indicate that some of the expanding Chinese exports to the U.S. have simply 
displaced Japanese and Asian NIE exports.   7 
by observed increases in Asia’s  production levels. At the same time, the migration of 
manufacturing activity to Asia may also generate net gains in  world  commodities 
demand. This is particularly the case for oil, since emerging Asia tends to consume 
considerably more energy per unit of production than in the developed economies. 
According to some estimates (see Rosen and Houser, 2007), Chinese firms use 20% to 
40% more energy for the same level of output compared to their OECD counterparts.
14 
 
4. Review of Literature 
Research on structural models for commodity prices have traditionally found that price 
movements tend to be driven by world industrial activity and the U.S. exchange rate. For 
examples of these studies, see Hua (1998) and Lalonde, Zhu, and Demers (2003). Hua 
(1998) and  Borensztein and Reinhart (1994) further find that oil price shocks play an 
important role in driving non-oil prices.  
More recently, an empirical study by Pain, Koske, and Sollie (2006) suggests that 
emerging economies have become a more  important  influence on commodity price 
movements over the last 5 years.  The authors represent growth in emerging markets 
using non-OECD shares of world output and trade, and find that relative strength in these 
economies exhibited significant and permanent effects on real oil prices, while only 
temporary effects on the level of real metals prices, and no effect on agricultural prices. 
However, specific analysis of emerging Asia’s impact on commodity prices has been 
limited to date,  given that its upsurge in demand  has been relatively recent. Given that 
many major emerging markets actually lowered their shares of world demand growth in 
commodities over the 2002-2005 period (see IMF, 2006), such as Brazil, India, Mexico 
and Russia, a focus on emerging Asia could lead to different results from the Pain et. al 
(2006) study. Within a DSGE framework, Lalonde and Muir (2006) are able to explain 
the recent rise in oil prices through simulating a permanent increase in  productivity in 
emerging Asia, combined with a further shock to energy intensity. However, empirical 
support for this outcome has been limited thus far in the literature.  
Since commodity prices respond to both demand and supply movements, it is also 
important to consider supply conditions. Borensztein and Reinhart (1994) argue that 
                                                  
14 This may be due to economic incentives that have favoured energy-intensive industries in China.  8 
traditional “demand-driven” structural models that ignore supply have tended to 
persistently over-predict real commodity prices by wide margins from the latter half of 
the 1980s into the early 1990s.
15 In practice, data on world commodity supply, demand, 
and inventories face limitations in terms of low quality, timeliness, and prohibitive cost.
16 
Consequently, lack of data availability is a standard restriction in much of the commodity 
price literature, and price predictions are commonly derived from statistical inference 
based solely on the observed prices.  
The specification of the commodity price equation also depends to a great extent on 
whether the series are stationary. While many commodity prices do not appear to be 
stationary over history, there is no clear consensus in the literature on whether this arises 
from deterministic trends, stochastic trends, or structural breaks. While earlier studies 
commonly assumed commodity prices to follow a random walk, much of the recent 
financial literature has argued in favour of modelling them as mean-reverting processes 
(see for example, Pindyck [2001], Schwartz and Smith [2000]). Intuitively, if a positive 
demand shock pushes the price of a commodity above its equilibrium level, producers 
would respond by increasing supply, thus pressuring prices down towards equilibrium. 
Non-stationarity can nonetheless arise because demand and supply adjustments are often 
slow, and shocks to commodity prices tend to be long-lasting, as shown by Cashin et al. 
(2000). The equilibrium price could also shift in response to changing expectations of the 
reserve base, political and regulatory climates, or production technologies.  
Perron (1990) demonstrated that the existence of structural shifts in the mean of a 
series may also give rise to the appearance of an integrated process, when in fact the 
series may be stationary within each regime. Lalonde et al. (2003) find this behaviour is 
consistent with real oil prices between 1974 and 2001. Using the methodology of Bai and 
Perron (1998), the authors find evidence of two structural breaks over this sample period, 
each coinciding with a major e xogenous shock that dramatically shifted supply 
                                                  
15 The authors suggest that this was due to the sharp increase in commodities exports from economies in 
transition in the former Soviet Union, which were not accounted for in most models.  
16 Frequency and units of measure also vary markedly across different countries and different types of 
commodities, making aggregation difficult. Furthermore, even if reliable production data can be obtained 
for a given commodity, it is arguably productive capacity which drives longer-term price behaviour. While 
supply capacity can be estimated from indicators such as reserves and investment in mining and resource 
sectors, such data remains difficult to obtain globally. Yet more difficult to capture are expected supply 
shortages, which can be important in influencing prices even in the absence of actual disruptions.  9 
expectations: the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 and the collapse of OPEC discipline in the mid-
1980s. Upon accounting for these structural shifts, real oil prices are found to be 
stationary within each regime. 
 
5. Theoretical Framework  
The approach used to estimate the impact of emerging Asia on commodity prices begins 
with a simple partial equilibrium framework of price formation in a storable commodity 
market. The market comprises of consumption demand, inventory demand, and supply:  
 
Dt = D{(L)Pt, (L)Yt, (L)Xt } 
Qt = Q { (L)Pt, P
e
t, (L)Zt } 
It  = I { (P
e
t+1-Pt), rt } 
 
With (L) denoting the lag operator, commodities demand (Dt) is a function of current and 
past levels of the price (Pt), income (Yt), and other exogenous variables (Xt). Supply (Qt) 
is also determined by current and past commodity prices, expected future prices,  and 
some exogenous variables (Zt). Inventory demand (It) is dependent on the cost of storage 
as defined by the interest rate (rt), and the expected profit from holding the stock, as 
defined by the expected change in price. Because commodities are storable, expectations 
about future market conditions can have immediate impacts on the demand for storage, 
and thus affect current prices. Finally, the market clearing price is that which equates 
consumption demand and inventory demand with supply: 
 
t t t I D Q D + =  
 
  The  lack of  data  precludes estimating this  system of equations for  world 
commodities supply, demand, and inventories.  Consequently, the commodity  price is 
typically  represented  by a  reduced-form  single-equation model, and  is a  function of 
income, lagged prices, price expectations, interest rates, and other exogenous variables: 
 
    } ) ( , , ) ( , ) ( , ) {(
1 1 t
e
t t t t t r L P X L P L Y L P P
+ - D =       (5.1) 
 
  From this equation, it would not be possible to identify the parameters in the 
structural system, nor disentangle effects of supply and demand adjustments. Variables  10 
such as expected future prices are also unobservable. T he dependent and independent 
variables considered for equation (5.1) are described in the following section. To estimate 
the impact of emerging Asia on commodity prices, we consider a number of different 
variables to represent the region’s growth in demand and intensity of resource use from 
both domestic demand and export channels. While it would be interesting to identify and 
distinguish between effects from domestic demand and export demand as described in 
Section 3, this is difficult in practice given that the two channels are highly correlated. 
    
5.1. Data 
All data series are quarterly and expressed as logarithms, with the exception of real world 
interest rates and variables in ratio form. More detailed sources and definitions of the data 
used are given in the Appendix. The commodity price series used are the benchmark WTI 
crude oil price and the base metals price index of the BCPI. To obtain real prices, the oil 
price is deflated using the U.S. GDP deflator, while the metals price index is deflated 
with the U.S. producer price index for finished goods.  
To represent demand from industrialized countries, the income variables considered 
are the OECD index of industrial production and the OECD output gap. These variables 
are expected to bear a positive relationship with prices, as increased production in major 
industrialized countries  would  raise input  demand  for commodities. Other  important 
determinants of commodities demand  are the U.S. real effective exchange rate and real 
world interest rates.  Since most commodities are traded and priced in U.S. dollars, a 
depreciation of the U.S.  dollar would allow other countries to purchase commodities 
more cheaply, and would thus be expected to generate higher demand levels and higher 
prices. The exchange rate variable is represented as the price of foreign currency, with an 
increase signifying a real depreciation of the U.S. dollar. The relationship between 
commodity prices and real interest rates, however, is less clear. An increase in interest 
rates could lower commodity demand by raising the costs of storage as well as slowing 
future aggregate demand, putting downward pressure on prices.  Conversely, rising 
interest rates could discourage investment activity by producers, thus lowering expected 
future supplies and driving commodity prices higher.  Since commodities are  also  11 
considered a financial asset class whose price can be influenced by investment demand, 
we also consider the Standard and Poors 500 stock index as a substitute good price. 
On the supply side, variables considered for the oil equation include data on world oil 
production capacity. For metals, an investment indicator was constructed from data on 
OECD real investment in metals and mining industries. This data provides a fairly rough 
measure of investment since it is only available to 2003, it is missing data for many of the 
OECD countries, and it also  excludes many major metals producing countries such as 
Mexico, Chile, and China. Real oil prices are also considered  in the equation for metals 
prices to represent costs of extraction and production. 
Various variables are considered to represent demand growth  in emerging Asia and 
rising resource intensities in the region. Emerging Asia is defined to include the 10 
countries of China, India, ASEAN-4, and the Asian NIEs. A major limitation faced is the 
availability and reliability of Chinese data, with many of the desired series available only 
since the mid-1990s, or else  only at annual frequencies, or in nominal  or growth rate 
form. Given these constraints, we construct an emerging Asia industrial production index 
using time-varying GDP weights on the individual industrial production indexes of the 10 
emerging Asia countries.
17  
Figure 19 shows the resulting  de-trended emerging Asia industrial production index, 
compared with the similarly de-trended OECD industrial production index. Both series 
are de-trended using a Hodrick-Prescott (HP)  filter, and Figure 20 illustrates the 
estimated trends in both series. Several observations are worth noting in these graphs. 
The first is that the trend in emerging Asia’s industrial production has increased 
considerably more rapidly than that of the OECD over time. The  second is that the 
production cycle in emerging Asia has become more closely correlated with that in the 
OECD since about 1997. The correlation coefficient between  the two series from 
1997Q3-2006Q2 is 0.58, compared with 0.29 from 1982Q1-1997Q2.  This may be a 
reflection of either increasing globalization  that has led to converging business cycles 
worldwide, or that the economies of emerging Asia have become more linked to those in 
the  developed world via export demand. Another notable item in Figure 19 is that the 
                                                  
17 While this measure overlaps somewhat with the OECD industrial production index, with South Korea 
included in both, the implications are expected to be minor given that its weight in OECD output is 
relatively small.  12
increase in emerging Asia’s industrial cycle since 2001 looks fairly modest relative to 
evidence of strong demand growth in  the region for commodities over the last 5 years, 
and relative to increases in industrial production observed in the early 1990s.  This 
observation  could be a sign that the  variable d oes not  convey the rising  resource 
intensities of production associated with expanding urban infrastructure and recent shifts 
in  Chinese manufacturing from labour-intensive goods towards more capital-intensive 
goods. 
Other variables are used to capture the increasing resource intensities in emerging 
Asia through the domestic demand channel, including China’s urbanization rate, China’s 
investment share of output, as well as a constructed metals intensity index for emerging 
Asia (displayed in Fig. 21). No energy intensity measure was constructed, since increases 
observed thus far have been modest (as shown in Fig. 9) and likely too recent to be 
captured in any estimations.  To reflect rising  resource  intensities through the export 
channel, variables used include emerging Asia’s share of world trade, China’s net exports 
of manufactured goods, China’s exports of manufactured goods as a share of the 
country’s GDP, Chinese exports of manufactured goods to the U.S., and Chinese exports 
of machinery and equipment to the U.S.
18 
 
6. Equation Specifications 
As our interest in commodity prices stems primarily from their importance for the 
Canadian economy, our analysis is centred on the commodities in the BCPI basket.  Since 
the most pronounced increases have been observed in the real prices for oil and base 
metals over recent years, we focus on these commodities. Two separate equations are 
estimated for the real oil price and the real base metals price index from the BCPI, given 
the heterogeneity across different commodity markets.
19  In particular, Lalonde et al. 
(2003) find that past oil price movements have been characterized by deterministic shifts 
that can be linked to specific events, which render prices to be nonstationary over history, 
but stationary within each estimated regime. This presence of stationarity in real  oil 
prices may  be the result of a tendency for supply and demand to grow at roughly the 
                                                  
18 Data on Chinese exports to Europe of manufactured goods and machinery and equipment were not 
available. 
19 For example, oil prices tend to be subject to idiosyncratic shocks related to geopolitical conflicts, because 
of the fact that the majority of world oil supplies are located in regions with political instability.  13 
same pace over time, or to adjust fairly rapidly to shocks. Meanwhile, real metals prices 
have exhibited a fairly cyclical nature over history (see Fig. 2), but unit root test results 
are not able to reject nonstationarity. In the absence of any structural shift, this 
nonstationarity may indicate that metals demand and supply have typically adjusted more 
slowly to shocks over time. 
 
6.1. Real Oil Prices 
Based on the  findings of Lalonde et al. (2003), we begin with an  examination of the 
behaviour of real oil prices since the authors’ last estimated break point of 1985Q3.  It 
can be seen that the series no longer appears stationary once the sample is extended to the 
end of 2006. Indeed, an  ADF test on real oil prices over the 1985Q4-2006Q4 interval 
yields a t-statistic of -1.66, confirming a failure to reject the presence of a unit root. This 
suggests the influence of some factors that  may  have generated yet another structural 
change, or else a stochastic shift in oil prices.20 Since it is difficult to know the cause of 
such a change, we first test for the presence of a structural shift. 
  We begin by estimating the same equation as Lalonde et al. (2003) for the level of 
oil prices using the Bai-Perron (BP) methodology for the 1985Q4-2006Q2 sample. Given 
the relatively short sample size, we allow for a maximum of one unknown break point, 
with all parameters free to shift at the point. As described in Lalonde et al. (2003), real oil 
prices are characterized by the following equation in each regime i:21 
 
      2 4 1 3 2 2 1 1 - - - - D + + + + = t i t i t i t i i t USREER WLYGAP RWTI RWTI C RWTI b b b b   (6.1) 
 
where WLYGAP is a world output gap (in logged form) and USREER is the logged U.S. 
real effective exchange rate.
22  
  The test detects the presence of a structural break in 1997Q2 at a 1% significance 
level. The resulting parameter estimates over each regime are shown  under the column 
labelled Y1 of  Table 3, which  indicate that the  WLYGAP variable is not statistically 
                                                  
20 The breakdown in stationarity over the extended sample may also indicate a divergence in the pace of 
demand growth relative to supply growth in recent years, or increasing marginal costs of oil production. 
21 This equation uses the first difference of the U.S. exchange rate, whereas Lalonde et al. (2003) had 
employed an exchange rate “gap” variable constructed using a HP filter. This does not affect the results 
materially. 
22 The world output gap is a production-weighted average of the gaps of the U.S., Canada, Mexico, the 
U.K., Europe, and Asia.  14 
significant in either of the estimated regimes. Consequently, we modified equation (6.1) 
by replacing the world output gap variable with the OECD output gap, OECD_GAP. This 
moved  the  estimated break date slightly to 1997Q3,  while  improving the fit of the 
equation. The results from this estimation are shown in the column entitled Y2 of Table 
3.
 23  While the OECD output gap was found to  bear a significant, positive impact on oil 
prices in the first regime of 1985Q4-1997Q3, it appears to have lost its statistical 
significance since mid-1997. Meanwhile, the U.S. exchange rate is only significant with 
the correct sign in the second regime.  
  The estimated break date in mid-1997 coincides well with the Asian currency 
crisis, which had considerably reduced demand for commodities from this region over 
this period. The fact that the OECD output gap became insignificant in the period after 
1997Q3 may suggest that oil prices became dominated by developments in emerging 
Asia’s demand around that time. To test this hypothesis, we included the emerging Asia 
industrial production index (ASIA_IPdt), de-trended  using a HP filter, into the modified 
equation (2) along with the OECD output gap. As shown in column  Y3 of Table 3, 
including the emerging Asia variable contemporaneously into the equation generated 
roughly the same break date (1997Q4) as specification Y2, and improved the adjusted R
2. 
While the variable was found to be insignificant in the first regime, since 1998Q1 it has 
produced a significant and positive impact on oil prices. These results point to a larger 
influence from emerging Asia on oil prices since 1997.
24 Alternative variables were also 
considered to capture the effect of emerging Asia on oil prices through both domestic 
demand and export channels, but these variables were found to either worsen the overall 
fit of the equation, or to be statistically insignificant.25 
  In order to account for possible endogeneity between the contemporaneous 
emerging Asia variable and oil prices, we also estimated the equation over the second 
                                                  
23 Alternative specifications were also tested with varying lag lengths and additional variables suspected to 
influence oil prices, such as the real world interest rate and oil production capacity. These variables were 
found either to be insignificant or to worsen the fit of the equation. 
24 Of course, emerging Asia may have also been a key source of demand for commodities even over the 
early 1990s (see Novin and Stuber, 1999). However, it is likely that its importance became more apparent 
when oil prices dropped in the wake of the Asian crisis, without any major change in the OECD output gap. 
25 Alternative variables include China’s investment share of output, China’s urbanization rate, emerging 
Asia’s share of world trade, China’s net exports of manufactured goods, China’s exports of manufactured 
goods as a share of GDP, Chinese exports of manufactured goods to the U.S., and Chinese exports of 
machinery and equipment to US.  15 
regime using generalized method of moments (GMM), with four lags of each regressor 
used as instruments and the standard errors adjusted using a five-lag Newey-West 
correction. The resulting parameter estimates were not significantly different from those 
produced by the BP methodology.  
  While the OECD gap variable remains significant and positive in the earlier 
regime, Table 2 shows that the inclusion of the emerging Asia industrial production 
variable now produces a significantly negative coefficient on the OECD gap since 
1998Q1. This may reflect some multicollinearity associated with increasing correlation 
that has emerged between the business cycles of the developed economies with emerging 
Asia since mid-1997, discussed in section 5.1. Nevertheless, given that the OECD output 
gap was found to be insignificant since 1997 in the absence of the emerging Asia variable 
(equation  Y2), it is desirable to remove it from the estimation when the emerging Asia 
variable is included. In order to do so, we estimate the oil equation using ordinary least 
squares (OLS) only over the latter 1998Q1-2006Q2 period, while removing the OECD 
output gap variable. The resulting estimates are (with t-statistics in parentheses): 
 
t t t t t IPdt ASIA REER US RWTI RWTI RWTI _ 807 . 5 _ 930 . 1 045 . 0 904 . 0 481 . 0
2 2 1 + D - - + =
- - -
       (2.81)     (5.34)            (-0.28)            (-2.35)               (3.18) 
    
which shows  a lower coefficient on the emerging Asia variable.  The cumulative AR 
coefficient of 0.859 on the above equation implies less persistence in oil prices when we 
account for emerging Asia, compared to the Y2 specification which does not. Ljung-Box 
Q-statistics also show no evidence of serial correlation in the residuals for up to 8 lags. 
These estimates imply a conditional mean price of oil that has increased in the 1998Q1-
2006Q2 regime to US$30.31 per barrel in real terms, compared to US$17.32 per barrel 
over the 1985Q4-1997Q4 regime. The results also suggest that over the current regime, a 
1 percent increase in Asian industrial production above trend is associated with a 5.8 
percent increase in real oil prices.  
  The use of the de-trended industrial production index for emerging Asia in the 
above analysis effectively attributes oil price movements to only temporary shocks in the 
region’s industrial activity. However, it is recognized that it may not be emerging Asia’s 
increase in output relative to trend that is driving recent oil price increases, but rather a  16 
permanent increase in its levels of economic activity  or trend output, resulting from 
higher productivity growth in recent years. If so, the above analysis would not capture 
this channel.  Given that oil prices are characterized by stationarity within regimes over 
most of history (Lalonde et. al [2003] estimate the last regime to span 1986Q1-2001Q4), 
the need to use stationary variables in the equation is a limitation of this analysis. At the 
same time,  HP-filter estimates of the trend in  Asian industrial production over the 
extended sample (1985Q4-2006Q2) do not reveal any visible shift relative to the trend 
estimated over shorter samples (neither 1985Q4-1997Q3 nor 1985Q4-2001Q4).  
  The fact that the emerging Asia variable seems to have dominated the positive 
influence from OECD demand since 1997 may indicate that the increasing share of world 
manufacturing activity that has migrated to emerging Asia in recent years has caused oil 
prices to be driven more by  industrial a ctivity in this region  than in the developed 
economies. If this is the case, then the impact captured in the estimated parameter of the 
emerging Asia variable may partly reflect oil demand that has simply shifted from one 
part of the world to another (i.e. the export channel), in addition to any incremental 
demand that the region may have added to world demand. Nonetheless, this shift has 
likely generated net gains in  world oil demand, as greater shares of world manufacturing 
activity have moved to a region with relatively higher trend output growth (shown in Fig. 
20), and which uses more energy per unit of output, relative to the developed world. 
  The results point to two main findings.  The first is  the presence of a break 
detected in the equilibrium price for oil in the last half of 1997. The second is that the 
cyclical behaviour of oil prices since that break point appears to be linked to emerging 
Asia’s industrial activity.  Although no conclusive evidence exists to explain the cause 
for the break, it appears to have possibly arisen from the increasing influence of emerging 
Asia. This would pose an additional challenge, as it would signify that the shift is more 
stochastic in nature, unlike previous breaks that were related to exogenous supply shocks 
or changes in OPEC behaviour.
26  However,  the number of observations available is 
insufficient to capture such a stochastic equilibrium shift.  In this context, the emerging 
Asia variable may be picking up the effects on oil prices possibly coming from any other 
                                                  
26 While there was a 10% increase in OPEC production quotas that took place in November 1997, no 
remarkable shifts in behaviour are visible from the production data around that time.  17 
trending factors  not included in the equation,  such as increased globalization  or 
geopolitical factors. Such a case would create upward bias to the impact suggested by the 
estimated coefficient of emerging Asia. Since the oil production capacity variable w as 
found to be insignificant over the sample, our estimated model for oil prices does not take 
into account developments in supply. As shown in Figure 6, the sharp decline in OPEC 
spare production capacity since 2002 points to an insufficient supply response to recent 
demand pressures, which may have contributed in part to the recent acceleration in price. 
The omission of this supply effect would imply an additional upward bias on emerging 
Asia’s estimated coefficient.   
 
6.2. Real Base Metals Prices   
The approach used to model real base metals prices is different from that for real oil 
prices. Unlike the case for oil, no specific events can be identified with metals prices to 
justify the presence of deterministic breaks.  As ADF test results on the real metals price 
index were not able to reject the presence of a unit root, we employ a stochastic approach 
to model them. Consistent with the idea that real commodity prices should revert to some 
equilibrium level, we therefore test for the possibility that real metals prices possess a 
stable long-run cointegrating relationship with some other macroeconomic activity 
variable or combination of variables. This was conducted using Engle and Granger 
(1987) residual-based tests on the estimated cointegrating equation, using the dynamic 
least squares method of Saikkonen (1991) to correct for endogeneity and serial 
correlation: 
      t
k
k j j t
j
t t v x b x RMTLS + D + b = ￿
- = -
' '       (6.2) 
 
where xt is a vector of I(1) variables cointegrated with the I(1) variable  RMTLSt, the 
logged real metals price index.    The estimated long-run  relationship between the 
variables is defined by the vector ß. Given evidence of a long-run equilibrium, a dynamic 
error correction equation (ECM) can be estimated using OLS, to model the short-term 
dynamics of metals prices: 
 
       ￿
= - - - m + d + b - l = D
m
j t j t j t t t Z x RMTLS RMTLS
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  18 
where Zt is a vector of I(0) exogenous variables, and  l is the estimated speed at which 
metals prices adjust back to their long-run level following a shock that pushes them away 
from equilibrium.  
  Given the commonly found relationship between commodity prices and 
macroeconomic activity in  developed  countries, cointegration was first tested between 
real metals prices and various combinations of the following variables: OECD industrial 
production, the U.S. real effective exchange rate, the real world interest rate,  real oil 
prices, and real OECD investment in metals and mining industries. 
 
Estimation Results 
The empirical analysis is conducted using a sample beginning from the earliest available 
data point in 1975Q3. Results from the cointegration tests reveal the strongest support for 
a long-run relationship between metals prices and OECD industrial production 
(OECD_IP), with allowance for a deterministic trend.  This cointegration, however, only 
exists for the sample up to 1997Q3.
27 The column (1) of Table 4a displays the results 
from this estimated cointegrated system. As shown by the ADF test statistic from the 
Engle-Granger test, the null hypothesis of no cointegration can be rejected at a 5% 
significance level for the sample up to 1997Q3.
28   It was also found that including 
emerging Asia variables (such as industrial production or trade share) in the long-run 
equation for the sample to 1997Q3 actually weakened the support for cointegration. This 
is demonstrated in column (2) of Table 4a, which shows results of the equation estimated 
over the same sample when emerging Asia industrial production (ASIA_IP) is included. 
Incorporating this variable lowers the ADF test statistic from the Engle-Granger test to a 
level that  no  longer supports the existence  of  cointegration, suggesting that emerging 
Asia did not influence long-run metals prices over this period. 
  Table 4b displays the estimated cointegrated system with OECD_IP (labelled Z1) 
over the period 1975Q3-1997Q3, along with the dynamic parameter estimates from the 
ECM. The adjustment parameter is statistically significant at the 5% level, lending further 
support to the existence of an equilibrium relationship between metals prices and 
                                                  
27 Tests were conducted beginning with the longest sample 1975Q3-2006Q4, with observations removed 
from the endpoint recursively until cointegration was found. 
28 This result was not altered significantly when the exchange rate, interest rate, oil price, or investment 
variables were included in the cointegrating equation.  19 
OECD_IP. The results suggest that a 1 percent increase in OECD industrial production 
leads to a long-term increase of 5.8 percent in real metals prices. The negative long-run 
coefficient on the time trend may be representative of improving supply conditions, as 
productivity gains in metals extraction and refining may have  contributed to the 
downward trend in prices over this period. Variables found to significantly influence the 
short-run dynamics of metals price movements were growth in OECD_IP as well as the 
first and third lag of first-differenced metals prices.  Estimation of the dynamic ECM 
equation was performed using OLS. Parameter estimates from a GMM estimation did not 
differ significantly, suggesting that endogeneity is not an issue.29  Ljung-Box Q-statistics 
on the residuals also do not detect any serial correlation up to 8 lags out, and the Jarque-
Bera statistic suggests they are normal with zero mean. 
  Interestingly, the long-run relationship found between metals prices and OECD 
industrial activity appears to break down once the sample is extended beyond 1997Q3. 
When the same long-run equation is estimated over the full sample 1975Q3-2006Q4, the 
ADF test statistic of  -1.766 fails to find evidence of cointegration over this period.30 
Figure 22 compares the estimated long-run equilibrium from the cointegrated system in 
Z1 against actual metals prices, while Figure 23 plots the gap between metals prices and 
this equilibrium. Upon examination of the gap, it appears that the failure to find 
cointegration between the two variables beyond 1997Q3 stems from the fact that metals 
prices remained persistently below equilibrium levels suggested by OECD industrial 
production for several years after this point. Similar to our findings for oil prices, this 
may have been caused by the Asian currency crisis, which significantly reduced world 
demand for commodities around that time. Since 2003, however, metals prices have 
surged well above equilibrium levels defined by OECD activity.  
 
Assessing the Impact of Emerging Asia    
The previous results suggest that since the end of 1997, metals prices have been driven 
primarily by factors other than industrial activity in the developed world. Determining 
whether this factor is emerging Asia poses a challenge, however, given the relatively 
                                                  
29 Four lags of each regressor were used as instruments for the estimation, with robust standard errors of the 
estimated parameters calculated using Newey-West correction with 8 lags. 
30 Tests for cointegration with a structural shift were also conducted using the Gregory-Hansen (1996) 
methodology. Test results did not provide strong evidence of cointegration with a regime shift.  20 
recent period since the region’s role would have likely b ecome significant. This makes 
finding any long-term relationship between metals prices and emerging Asia particularly 
difficult within the “cointegration” framework. We thus conduct a series of experiments 
in order to assess whether the collapse of the long-run relationship between real metals 
prices and OECD industrial production is related to a greater influence from emerging 
Asia on world demand for metals. This exercise consists of testing whether including 
various emerging Asia variables into the long-run equation ( 6.2) over the extended 
sample can explain the discrepancy between metals prices and their equilibrium since the 
end of 1997.  The emerging Asia variables tested are listed and described in the Data 
Appendix. 
  Figure 24 compares the estimated m etals price equilibrium  when the emerging 
Asia industrial production index is included into the long-run equation along with the 
OECD industrial production index, a specification  labelled  Z2. Figure 25 compares the 
disequilibrium gap from Z2 with that from the original Z1 equation. The full sample now 
becomes 1982Q1-2006Q2, based on the data available for emerging Asia. It can be seen 
that accounting for ASIA_IP considerably reduces the negative disequilibrium gap created 
by  the original  Z1  equation over the 1997 to 2003 interval. This  could signify that 
weakness in emerging Asia was a factor pulling metals prices below equilibrium levels 
suggested by OECD industrial activity over this period.  
  It is useful to compare the fit of this alternative specification with the original one. 
The first column of Table 5 reports the results from  GMM estimations of the dynamic 
ECM for Z1e, the original specification re-estimated over the sample 1982Q1-2006Q2.
31 
The short-run dynamics of the equation are also modified to i nclude  DUSREERt, 
DOECD_IPt,  and  DASIA_IPt-1. Results from similar estimations of scenario Z2 are 
shown in the second column of Table 5.
32  As mentioned earlier, the long-run relationship 
between metals prices and OECD_IP no longer holds over this longer sample. Because 
the impact from emerging Asia has likely been too recent, including the ASIA_IP variable 
                                                  
31 GMM estimates are reported in Table 5 because they yielded significantly different parameter estimates 
for DASIA_IPt-1 than those from OLS estimations, suggesting the existence of endogeneity issues. 
32 The results shown are from a two-stage estimation of the equations. In the first stage, the long-run 
equation was estimated using the dynamic OLS method of Saikkonen (1991). The long-run parameter 
estimates were then imposed in the GMM estimation of the dynamic equation.  One-step estimations of the 
full system were also performed using nonlinear least squares, but these did not change the results 
significantly and are thus not reported.  21 
into the equation (Z2)  still  does not lead to cointegration.33 As a result, the long-run 
parameter estimates shown in Table 5 cannot be interpreted as an equilibrium 
relationship. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that incorporating ASIA_IP over this 
sample now increases (in absolute terms) the ADF test statistic from the cointegration test 
relative to Z1– this contrasts with the findings from the shorter sample ending in 1997Q3, 
shown in Table 4a.  Interestingly, if we sum the long-run coefficients from the Z2 
estimation, the total implied effects of the  OECD_IP and ASIA_IP variables on metals 
prices roughly equals the estimated long-run impact from OECD industrial production in 
the shorter sample up to 1997Q3 (Z1). As discussed in section 6.1, this may reflect the 
shift in metals demand from the developed world to emerging Asia as multinational firms 
have outsourced manufacturing activity there. The relatively larger coefficient on 
ASIA_IP also supports the notion that industrial activity in emerging Asia has been more 
important in driving world metals demand since 1997. 
While industrial activity in emerging Asia may have contributed to the metals 
price weakness relative to equilibrium in the period after 1997, Figure 25 illustrates that it 
does not explain well the relative strength observed in metals prices since the end of 
2003. A possible reason for this is that the ASIA_IP variable does not capture well the 
rising metals intensities in Asian manufacturing sectors, as discussed in Section 5.1. To 
account for this possibility, we further add the metals intensity index (INTENS) in the 
equation along with ASIA_IP. Since metals intensity data was only available from 1995 
onwards, the index was interacted with a dummy variable (Dum) which assumes a value 
of zero up to 1997Q3, and a value of one afterwards. This specification is labelled Z3. 
Figure 27 compares the disequilibrium gap from this scenario with that from equation Z1. 
We can see that accounting for rising metals intensities in emerging Asia appears to 
explain the strength in metals prices q uite well up to the end of 2005. Where the 
specifications falls short, however, is over the last two quarters of the sample, 2006Q1-
2006Q2.  Over this period, metals prices surged despite that emerging Asia’s metals 
intensities appear to have declined (see Fig. 21). While the reason for this decline is not 
                                                  
33 A weighted “world” industrial production index was also constructed using a GDP-weighted aggregate of 
OECD and emerging Asia industrial production series. This variable was also not found to be cointegrated 
with metals prices, and also generated a negative coefficient (while causing the coefficient on the time 
trend to switch signs).  22 
clear, it is possible that the  intensity data for 2006 is less reliable, given that metals 
consumption data tends to undergo frequent revisions. It is also possible that increased 
speculative investment activity has been a larger influence on metals price behaviour in 
2006. 
  Despite that the need for a dummy variable makes it inappropriate to evaluate the 
equation  Z3  within a cointegration framework,  it is useful to consider the estimation 
results in column 3 of Table 5.  The positive and significant coefficient on  INTENS  
suggests that the increase in metals prices above levels that would be predicted by both 
OECD and Asian industrial activity  since 2003 may be explained by rising metals 
intensities in emerging Asia   This is further supported by the observation that the 
adjustment parameter is larger and more significant when both ASIA_IP and INTENS are 
incorporated into the defined “equilibrium”, relative to when it is characterized only by 
OECD activity in Z1e.  
   
7.0.  Concluding remarks 
The purpose of this paper was to assess the impact of emerging Asia on the real prices 
of oil and base metals in the Bank of Canada Commodity Price Index (BCPI). Although 
we find strong evidence that oil and metals prices have historically moved with the 
business cycle in developed economies, this relationship has broken down since mid-
1997.  Thereafter, results suggest that industrial activity in emerging Asia has become a 
more dominant driver of oil price movements.  This may be related to the increased 
outsourcing of production to Asia from the developed economies, which would generate 
higher levels of energy demand as relatively energy-inefficient Asian firms take on 
greater shares of world manufacturing activity. For metals, price fluctuations also appear 
to have become increasingly aligned with emerging Asia’s industrial activity since mid-
1997. Unlike the case for oil, incorporating Asian industrial production is not sufficient to 
explain the surge in metals prices since 2002, and it appears that rising metals intensities 
in the region have provided the additional boost to prices over recent years. Because 
these influences began so recently, it remains too soon to obtain precise estimates of their 
long-run impact. The fact that an increasing share of world manufacturing activity has 
relocated to emerging Asia in recent years suggests that the estimated parameter on  23 
emerging Asia industrial production may reflect not only the incremental commodities 
demand from the region, but also the demand that has simply relocated  from the 
industrialized world. There may also be some upward bias on this parameter estimate 
coming other excluded factors that may have been at play, such as supply shortfalls, 
speculative investment demand, increasing globalization, or geopolitical unrest (in the 
case of oil).   
Rising intensities within emerging Asia may also play a larger role going forward, as 
expanding urban infrastructure and shifts in Chinese manufacturing from labour-intensive 
goods towards capital-intensive goods are expected to push metals and energy intensities 
higher going forward. Resource-intensive consumption may also become more important 
in the future, as rising incomes generate greater motor vehicle ownership and 
consumption of household durables. Our analysis suggests that emerging Asia’s impact 
on commodity prices will likely persist for many years as rising urbanization rates 
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Table 1. Component Weights in Bank of Canada Commodity Price Index 
 
Weights  Canadian Production shares 
(1988-99) 
ENERGY:  33.9% 
Oil  21.4% 
Natural Gas  10.7 
Coal  1.8% 
NON-ENERGY:  66.1% 
Metals   14.3% 
  Base Metals:      11.7% 
       Aluminium  5.0% 
       Copper  2.0% 
       Nickel  2.4% 
        Zinc  2.2% 
   Precious Metals:  2.6% 
        Gold  2.3% 
        Silver  0.3% 
Minerals  2.3% 
  Potash  1.7% 
Forestry  33.4% 
  Lumber  13.6% 
  Pulp    12.1% 
  Newsprint  7.7% 
Food  16.8% 
 Grains & Oilseeds:  5.9% 
      Wheat  3.4% 
      Canola  1.2% 
      Barley  0.7% 
      Corn  0.5% 
   Livestock:  9.7% 
      Cattle  7.9% 
      Hogs  1.8% 
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Real Non-Energy Commodity Price Index, 1982-90=100 (left)
Real WTI Crude Oil Price USD/bbl, deflator base year 1982-90 (right)
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Fig.5:  OECD Real Investment in Metals and Mining Industries (Mlns USD)
relative to OECD Industrial  Production Index
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Table 2. Shares of World Demand Growth
¥ 





















Oil  23%  35%  6%  5%  0%  0%  3%  5%  12%  3% 
Aluminium  32%  46%  7%  6%  0%  3%  0%  3%  0%  4% 
Copper  26%  62%  12%  5%  0%  4%  8%  13%  4%  5% 
Nickel  4%  63%  37%  28%  2%  0%  0%  4%  2%  0% 
Zinc  32%  88%  13%  4%  0%  0%  2%  4%  2%  5% 
¥ Source: BP Statistical Review 2006, World Bureau of Metal Statistics. Demand growth is calculated as the change in units consumed 
over the stated period. 
* Asian NIEs include Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. 
** ASEAN-4 countries include Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand. 
 
Fig. 7 














































































































































































































Fig.  9.  Primary  Energy  Consumption  per  GDP 30 
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China's Investment Share of Output (right)
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Fig. 16: Urban Population Percentage
Source: World Bank Source: IMF International Financial Statistics
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Fig. 18 
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Source: IMF Direction of Trade   
 
Fig. 19. Industrial Production Cycles:           Fig. 20. Industrial Production Trends: 
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Table 3. Real Oil Prices: Bai-Perron Estimation Results 
  Y1   Y2  Y3 
Regime 1:  1985Q4-1997Q2  1985Q4-1997Q3  1985Q4-1997Q4 
C        1.291*** 
(6.53) 
     1.386*** 
(7.18) 
     1.620*** 
(3.13) 
RWTIt-1       0.715*** 
(7.37) 
     0.698*** 
(8.22) 
     0.678*** 
(5.89) 
RWTIt-2   -0.168* 
(-1.86) 
     -0.186*** 
(-2.45) 
  -0.246** 
(-2.03) 
WLYGAPt-1  4.796 
(1.63) 
   
OECD_GAPt-1         0.033*** 
(2.54) 
     0.034*** 
(2.57) 






ASIA_IPdtt      -1.550 
(-1.35) 
Regime 2:  1997Q3-2006Q2  1997Q4-2006Q2  1998Q1-2006Q2 




     0.589*** 
(3.67) 
RWTIt-1       1.199*** 
(10.12) 
      1.200*** 
(9.62) 
     0.825*** 
(5.66) 






WLYGAPt-1  -0.034 
(-0.01) 
   
OECD_GAPt-1    0.010 
(0.45) 
  -0.042** 
(-2.11) 
D USREERt-2       -2.449*** 
(-3.13) 




ASIA_IPdtt           7.855*** 
(5.00) 
Adj-R
2  0.850  0.856  0.874 
Notes:  
1. T-statistics in parentheses. 
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Table 4a. Real Metals Prices: Cointegration Test Results 
Sample: 1975Q3-1997Q3  (1)  (2) 












   ASIA_IPt    2.417 
(2.35) 









1.  T-statistics are given in parenthesis, unless otherwise stated. 
2. 
¥ denotes MacKinnon (1996) critical values used. 
 
 
Table 4b: Real Metals Prices: Estimated ECM (1975Q3-1997Q3) 
  Z1 
Long-Run Parameters   
    C       -20.198*** 
(-7.40) 
   Trend       -0.033*** 
(-9.37) 





  -0.202** 
(-3.91) 
Dynamic Parameters   
    C     -0.021** 
(-2.13) 
    DRMTLSt-1     0.194** 
(2.05) 
    DRMTLSt-3       0.220*** 
(2.37) 
    DOECD_IPt       4.307*** 
(4.80) 
Adj -R2  0.319 
Jarque-Bera  1.835 
Notes: 
1.  T-statistics are given in parenthesis, unless otherwise stated. 
2.  *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
3. 
§ denotes Ericsson and MacKinnon (2002) critical values used. 




  34 
 









1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Logged Real Metals  Price Index
Z1 Equilibrium  Level








1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Estimated Equilibrium Gap (Z1)
 
 








82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04
Logged Real Metals Price Index
Z2 Equilibrium Level






















82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04
Logged Real Metals Price Index
Z3 Equilibrium Level








82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04
Z1 Z3
Estimated Equilibrium Gaps
  35 
Table 5. Real Metals Prices: Estimated ECM with Emerging Asia  
(1982Q1-2006Q2) 
Variable  Z1e  Z2  Z3 
Long-Run Parameters       










































Dynamic Parameters       































2  0.274  0.276  0.298 
Jarque-Bera  0.063  0.048  0.319 
  Notes:  
1.  T-statistics are given in parenthesis, unless otherwise stated. 
2. 
¥ denotes MacKinnon (1996) critical values used. 
















  36 
 
 
Data Sources and Definitions 
 
Commodity prices: Real oil price used is the West Texas Intermediate crude oil price 
deflated by the U.S. GDP deflator. Real metals price used is the base metals price index 
from the Bank of Canada Commodity Price Index (BCPI), deflated by the U.S. producer 
price index for finished goods. The BCPI has a base of 1982-90 =100 and is expressed in 
U.S. dollars.  
 
Commodities Consumption (Volumes):  Oil and energy consumption data are from the 
BP Statistical Review 2006. Consumption data for the metals (zinc, aluminum, nickel and 
copper) are from the World Bureau of Metal Statistics and UN Commodity Yearbook 
2003, at an annual frequency. Metals per capita consumption data is constructed with 
World Bank Development Indicators annual population data. 
 
Output measures:  
•  OECD Industrial Production Index: Quarterly, from OECD Main Economic 
Indicators  database 
•  World output gap: Quarterly production-weighted average of the gaps of U.S., 
Canada, Mexico, U.K., Europe, and Asia, constructed by the Bank of Canada. 
•  OECD output gap:  Quarterly, from the OECD Economic Outlook database, in which 
potential output is estimated from a production function approach. 
 
US effective exchange rate: Foreign exchange value of the U.S. dollar, U.S. Federal 
Reserve Board of Governors broad index, 1973=100. 
 
Real word interest rate: a trade-weighted average of interest rates of Japan, U.K., the 
Euro zone, and U.S, deflated by trade-weighted GDP deflator. 
 
Supply side variables:  
•  Oil Production Capacity: constructed by summing data on world oil production with 
data on world spare production capacity. World oil production data is quarterly from 
the U.S Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration, while spare 
capacity data is annual from the IMF World Economic Outlook (August 2006), with 
quarterly values interpolated. 
•  Real OECD Investment in Metals and Mining industries: Annual data to 2003 from 
the OECD STAN database, with quarterly values interpolated. 
 
Emerging Asia  variables:  
Country coverage: Emerging Asia includes the following ten countries: China, India, 
Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and 
Thailand. 
•  Emerging Asia Industrial Production Index: constructed from the 10 individual 
country indexes of industrial production in the manufacturing sector where available, 
and total industrial production otherwise. Individual country quarterly indexes are first  37 
seasonally adjusted using the X11 method and then aggregated using GDP weights, 
1990=100. China’s industrial production index is constructed from National Accounts 
data from the Chinese Statistical Yearbook on real production in the secondary 
industry. Prior to 1992, this series is only available at an annual frequency, with 
quarterly values interpolated. Taiwan’s industrial production index  is constructed 
from National Accounts data on GDP for the manufacturing sector. For the remaining 
Asian countries, quarterly industrial production indexes are obtained from the OECD 
Main Economic Indicators database for Indonesia, IMF International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) for Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Hong Kong, Korea, and India, 
and the Bank of International Settlements for Thailand. 
•  Metals intensity index: The emerging Asia metals intensity index is constructed by 
first summing the units consumed of a given metal across the 10 countries and 
dividing by the sum of the region’s real GDP to obtain an emerging Asia intensity 
measure for each metal. Intensity idexes are constructed for each metal with base year 
1995. Each of the four intensity indexes are then weighted according to their weight in 
the BCPI to form the overall metals intensity index. The series begins in 1995, based 
on availability of consumption data for the full set of metals across all 10 countries .  
Since all data are annual, a quarterly index is then constructed through interpolation.  
•  China’s urbanization rate: annual from the World Bank Development Indicators, with 
quarterly values interpolated. Defined as the percentage of the population living in 
cities.  
•  China’s investment share: Annual data on nominal investment from the IMF IFS, with 
quarterly values interpolated.  
•  Chinese exports of manufactured goods to the U.S. and Chinese exports of machinery 
and equipment to the U.S.:  monthly data from 1997- 2006 from Datastream. Prior to 
1997, levels are constructed assuming the same growth rate as Chinese total exports of 
manufactured goods (an annual series from Datastream, with quarterly values 
interpolated).  
•  Emerging Asia trade share: An aggregate of 10 countries’ total trade (exports and 
imports) as a ratio to total world trade. Quarterly nominal export and import data is 
obtained from the IMF IFS, deflated using different price indexes and seasonally 
adjusted using X11 methodology. For Singapore, Hong Kong and South Korea, the 
country’s export and import price indexes from the IFS are used as deflators, and 
Taiwan trade data is deflated using an average of these countries’ deflators. For the 
remaining emerging Asia countries, exports and imports are deflated using the Asia 







      
 